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This Comment argues that United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez signals an unwarranted limi-
tation on constitutional protections which may present disturbing ramifications for aliens in U.S.
courts. Part I of this Comment examines the line of cases that extend constitutional protections to
citizens beyond U.S. borders and to aliens within U.S. territory. Part II discusses the factual and
procedural background of the Verdugo-Urquidez case. Part III discusses the reasoning of the plu-
rality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyses the plurality opinion and suggests that
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez reverses a trend extending constitutional protection outside the
United States. This Comment concludes that Verdugo-Urquidez may foreshadow a limitation of
constitutional protections for new classes of individuals.
UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ: RESTRICTING
THE BORDERS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution pros-
cribes unreasonable searches and seizures by U.S. government
officials.' Traditionally, the fourth amendment applied to any
search conducted by a U.S. agent.2 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, recently decided that the fourth amendment does not
govern an extraterritorial search of the property of an alien
who lacks sufficient connection with the United States.3 The
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez4 decision abruptly halts the
Court's trend toward extending constitutional protection ex-
traterritorially.5
This Comment argues that United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
signals an unwarranted limitation on constitutional protections
which may present disturbing ramifications for aliens in U.S.
courts. Part I of this Comment examines the line of cases that
extend constitutional protections to citizens beyond U.S. bor-
ders and to aliens within U.S. territory. Part II discusses the
factual and procedural background of the Verdugo-Urquidez
case. Part III discusses the reasoning of the plurality, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyses the plurality
opinion and suggests that United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
reverses a trend extending constitutional protection outside
the United States. This Comment concludes that Verdugo-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides that
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
2. See infra notes 6-66 (discussing traditional application of fourth amendment).
See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 1.1, at 7-8 (2d ed. 1987) (stating that "effect of the fourth amendment is to
put the courts of the United States and federal officials, in the exercise of their power
and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority").
3. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
4. d.
5. Id. at 1066; see Recent Development, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 30 VA.J.
INT'L L. 827 (1990).
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Urquidez may foreshadow a limitation of constitutional protec-
tions for new classes of individuals.
I. HISTORY OF EXTENSION OF U.S. CONSTITUTION
The exclusionary rule states that evidence seized in viola-
tion of one's constitutional rights may not be admitted at trial
against the victim of the constitutional violation.6 This rule
was intended to deter law enforcement personnel from con-
ducting searches that exceed constitutional norms and to pro-
tect individuals against illegal searches and seizures.7 The rule
suppresses evidence procured in violation of a defendant's
fourth,8 fifth, 9 or sixth' amendment rights." In Verdugo-
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence
seized during warrantless search of defendant's home must be suppressed). The ex-
clusionary rule prohibits unconstitutional government conduct by suppressing evi-
dence obtained in an unconstitutional manner. Id. at 657. The rule preserves the
"judicial integrity" of the courts by preventing their participation in police miscon-
duct. Id. at 643. But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). (holding that
exclusionary rule should not apply when police act in good faith reliance on invalid
warrant). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 1.1; Annotation, Modern Statutes
of Rule Governing Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 50
A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
7. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 1 (containing text of fourth amend-
ment).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his Defence.
Id.
11. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The protections of the Bill of Rights only apply to state
action. The activities of foreign governments and private citizens are not circum-
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Urquidez, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the
fourth amendment applies to searches outside the United
States of a residence belonging to a non-resident alien who is
involuntarily present in the United States. 12
Before Verdugo-Urquidez, the U.S. Supreme Court never di-
rectly addressed the issue of whether aliens abroad enjoyed
fourth amendment rights.' 3. Lower federal courts addressing
this issue have applied two fundamentally different theoretical
analyses.' 4 The first theory, the natural rights theory,' 5 fo-
scribed by the fourth amendment. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455-56
n.31 (1976) ("It is well established, of course, that the exclusionary rule, as a deter-
rent sanction, is not applicable where a private party or a foreign government com-
mits the offending act."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688-
89 (2d ed. 1988); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 1.6(g) at 139.
12. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1059-66 (1990).
13. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 970 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Mikva,J., concurring specially) (noting that "Supreme Court has never deter-
mined whether aliens are entitled to the protections of our Bill of Rights outside the
United States"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 721 comment b (1987) (stating that it has not been definitely adju-
dicated whether U.S. Constitution governs exercises of authority by United States in
respect of aliens abroad).
14. See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text (discussing two approaches).
But see Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 773 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying third
theory which called for contextual determination of alien's constitutional rights, with
particular inquiry into status of both individual complaining and actor complained
of); see also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 973 (11 th Cir. 1984) (stating, in dicta, that
"aliens who are victims of unconstitutional government action abroad are protected
by the Bill of Rights if the government seeks to exploit fruits of its unlawful conduct
in a criminal proceeding in the United States"), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
15. Evidence of the natural rights theory in U.S. history can be traced back as far
as the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence states that
"all [persons] . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain Unalienable Rights, that
among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The Declaration of
Independence 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 556 (2d ed. 1836).
The Declaration of Independence was not suggesting, however, that slaves and Indi-
ans were included in the class of persons who enjoyed these unalienable rights. In
introducing the Bill of Rights,James Madison stated that the Bill of Rights "expressly
declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution." 1 ANNALS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 440, 449 (J. Gales ed. 1834); see Note, The
Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 676
(1986) (discussing Framers' intent to have Constitution's protection apply to all indi-
viduals) [hereinafter Note, Unalienable Rights]; see also Henkin, Rights: Here and There,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1582,. 1584-90 (1981); Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 405 (1979); Note, Searching the World Over: Applying the Exclusionary
Rule to Searches of Aliens by U.S. Agents, 7 LAw & INEQUALITY 489, 501 (1989) (asserting
that natural rights theory of constitutional rights requires U.S. government to treat
all people equally regardless of nationality) [hereinafter Note, Searching the World].
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cuses on the activity of the U.S. government.' 6 The natural
rights theory views the government as a creature of the Consti-
tution, bound by it in all governmental activities. 17 According
to this theory, the U.S. government cannot infringe on certain
universal and unalienable rights.'" The second, the compact
or social contract theory, focuses on the relationship of the
claimant to the United States.' 9 This theory views the Consti-
tution as a social contract between the people of the United
States and the U.S. government. 20 Under the social contract
theory, only parties to the contract have enforceable rights and
duties under it.2 ' Hence, only those individuals who have as-
16. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1544 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (applying natural rights theory and finding that U.S. government
officers are creatures of law and bound to obey law); United States v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227, 244 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (stating that U.S. public officials' actions are
governed by, measured against, and must be authorized by Constitution).
17. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 244 (stating that "there has never been a time when
United States authorities exercised governmental powers in any geographical area-
whether at war or in times of peace-without regard for their own Constitution"); see
Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1672,
1674 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Extraterritorial Applicability].
18. Note, Unalienable Rights, supra note 15, at 653; see Saltzburg, The Reach of Bill
of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 747 n.30
(1980) (stating that "extraterritorial reach [of Bill of Rights] is coextensive with the
protections they guarantee within the U.S. territory. Thus, the fourth and fifth
amendments curb the search, seizure, and interrogation powers of U.S. officials
abroad, even where the object of that protection is not a U.S. citizen"); Note, Search-
ing the World, supra note 15, at 500.
19. Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
835 (1960) (applying compact theory and asserting that non-resident aliens claiming
injury from U.S. nuclear tests cannot appeal to protection of Constitution or laws of
United States); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C.
1976) (accepting rule that non-resident aliens have no standing to sue in U.S. courts);
see Note, Immigration and the first Amendment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1914 (1985); see
also Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L. 777, 783-85 (1980).
20. FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that foreign na-
tionals abroad are neither parties nor beneficiaries of Constitution); see Stephan, supra
note 19, at 783; see also B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
21. League v. De Young, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 184, 202 (1850) (stating that Consti-
tution was made by, and for protection of people of United States); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819) (Marshall, CJ.) (noting that U.S.
government is a government of the people-its powers are granted by them, exer-
cised directly on them, and for their benefit); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 471 (1793) (Jay, CJ.) (stating that Constitution is compact made by U.S. people
to govern themselves in certain manner); see Stephan, supra note 19, at 782 (noting
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sumed some duties under the Constitution can assert rights
under the Constitution.
Natural rights theorists argue that the contractual ap-
proach is inconsistent with the historical application of consti-
tutional rights to non-citizens.22 The contractual approach,
they contend, grants rights to U.S. citizens only.23 But because
certain constitutional protections have historically been af-
forded to both legal 24 and illegal aliens25 in the United States,
citizenship cannot be used as a standard for applying constitu-
tional protections.26
Proponents of the compact theory criticize the natural
rights theory for its overly expansive application of the Consti-
tution.27 They contend that if all persons possess natural and
that "foreign nationals abroad are neither parties to nor beneficiaries of the agree-
ment between the federal government and its people embodied in the Constitu-
tion").
22. See The Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 528 (2d ed.
1836). James Madison, speaking against the Alien and Sedition Acts less than a dec-
ade after the adoption of the fourth amendment, stated that "it does not follow, be-
cause aliens are not parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that,
whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection." Id. at 556.
23. See Saltzburg, supra note 18, at 747 n.29 (noting that it would be "odd" if
founding fathers intended U.S. power to be exerted in foreign nations without con-
stitutional limitations); Note, Unalienable Rights, supra note 15, at 653 (expressing view
that only U.S. citizens are beneficiaries of social contract "takes a contract metaphor
useful for describing the Framers' view of the proper basis for the creation of govern-
ment, and attempts to use it as a rigid rule for limiting constitutional protection");
Brief for Respondent Verdugo-Urquidez at 24, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
24. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1885) (finding that fourteenth
amendment provisions are universal in their application to all persons within U.S.
territory); see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (finding that
resident alien is person within meaning of fifth amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (finding that resident aliens enjoy first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams,
194 U.S. 279, 291 (1904) (noting that fifth and sixth amendments protect aliens once
they are in United States); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)
(finding that persons within U.S. territory are entitled to protection guaranteed by
fifth and sixth amendments).
25. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (holding that equal protection
clause of fourteenth amendment bars states from denying public education to illegal
aliens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (noting that all aliens within jurisdic-
tion of United States enjoy protections of fifth and fourteenth amendments).
26. See Note, Unalienable Rights, supra note 15, at 653; supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text (discussing extension of constitutional protections to non-resident aliens).
27. Stephan, supra note 18, at 783; Reply Brief for United States at 5-6, United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353) [hereinafter U.S.
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unalienable rights that cannot be arbitrarily violated by the
government, then aliens injured by U.S. military operations,
for example, would have a cause of action against the U.S. gov-
ernment.28 Compact theorists argue that the natural rights
theory ignores indications from the U.S. Supreme Court that
aliens affected by the United States only have limited constitu-
tional protections.29
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered these theories in
determining the scope of an alien's constitutional rights within
and beyond U.S. borders. As early as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 30 the Court extended fourteenth amendment protection
to aliens residing within the United States.3 ' Resident aliens
were considered to be parties to the Constitution and entitled
to its protection.32
As a result of Yick Wo, aliens within the United States now
enjoy a broad panoply of rights,3 3 although they are not guar-
Reply Brief]. See generally Note, The Constitutional Rights of Nonresident Aliens Prosecuted in
the United States, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 221 (1980).
28. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1065 (1990); infra
notes 136-41 and accompanying text (discussing problems ofjudicially created cause
of action).
29. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concur-
ring) (noting that alien becomes "invested with the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution" only after entering United States and accepting some societal obligations);
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (holding that alien
does not become one of people protected by Constitution when attempting to enter
United States illegally).
30. 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
31. Id. at 369. In Yick Wo, a San Francisco ordinance barred the operation of
hand laundries in wooden buildings except with the consent of the Board of Supervi-
sors. Id. at 357. The Board gave permits to all but one of the non-Chinese appli-
cants, but to none of the nearly 200 Chinese applicants. Id. at 359. The Court held
that although the ordinance was neutral on its face, there was discrimination in its
administration, and this discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
373.
32. See id.
33. Aliens within the United States generally enjoy the benefits of the first, fifth,
sixth, and fourteenth amendments. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990); see Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976) (holding that barring alien from position in U.S.
federal government was deprivation of liberty interest and alien was protected by
fifth amendment's guarantee of due process); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971) (declaring that discrimination against aliens by states is inherently sus-
pect, subject to strict scrutiny by courts, and only justified by compelling state inter-
est); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (holding that resident
alien is "person" within meaning of fifth amendment); Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Mur-
phyJ., concurring) (emphasizing that among protections enjoyed by resident aliens
1990-1991] UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ 273
anteed all constitutional protections.34 Indeed, the Court has
stated that all aliens are not necessarily classified or treated
alike under all circumstances.3 5 Nevertheless, some constitu-
tional protections have been extended to aliens within the
United States, and in those cases no distinctions have been
made between those who reside in the United States legally or
illegally.36
Until the late nineteenth century, the Court implicitly ad-
hered to a compact theory approach in defining the scope of
constitutional protections granted to citizens and aliens 7.3  The
Court strictly construed the Constitution to find that it had no
application outside the United States for any category of indi-
vidual.3 8 In deciding In re Ross,3 9 the Court considered
are first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights); Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) (find-
ing aliens within United States sheltered by fourth amendment in common with citi-
zens).
34. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (recognizing that aliens have
limited equal protection rights where public function is involved); Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291 (1978) (finding exclusion of aliens from state police force did not vio-
late equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment because police officers are
within category of non-elective officers who participate in execution of laws); Ma-
thews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (denying welfare benefits to some classes of
aliens); see also Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MIcH.
L. REV. 1092 (1977).
35. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78. The Court said that
[t]he fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due
Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are
entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclu-
sion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classifica-
tion.
Id.
36. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1222 (noting that aliens within United States
generally enjoy first, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments); see Immigration & Nat-
uralization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (implying that ille-
gal aliens within United States have fourth amendment rights); supra notes 24 & 25
(discussing constitutional rights granted to legal and illegal aliens).
Even non-resident aliens have been granted constitutional rights against the tak-
ing of property within the United States without just compensation. See United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.
481, 489 (1931) (stating that friendly aliens are entitled to just compensation under
fifth amendment).
37. See Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 11, 19-21 (1985) (noting that histori-
cally Constitution did not protect citizens or aliens outside United States).
38. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
39. Id. In Ross, a U.S. seaman, stationed in Japan, was convicted by the U.S.
consular tribunal of murder and sentenced to death, his sentence was later corn-
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whether a U.S. citizen in Japan should be granted the constitu-
tional right to a grand jury proceeding and a trial by a petit
jury.40 The Court adopted a strict territorial approach to the
Constitution by holding that constitutional protections do not
apply to U.S. citizens outside the United States.4 '
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Court
gradually expanded its strict territorial application of the Con-
stitution in a series of cases known as the Insular Cases.4 2 In
these cases, the Court concluded that inhabitants of lands pos-
sessed by the United States were protected by the Constitution
if Congress had "incorporated" the territory into the United
States.43 In one of the Insular Cases, Dorr v. United States,44 for
example, the Court found that although the United States
could deny a jury trial to a U.S. citizen living abroad, the
United States could not deny that citizen a fair trial and funda-
mental due process.4 5 Thus, the Insular Cases stand for the
proposition that the Constitution is applicable outside the
muted to life imprisonment by President Hayes. Id. at 454-55. Nearly ten years later,
petitioner brought a habeas corpus action, contending that his trial before the U.S.
consular tribunal in Japan violated his constitutional rights to indictment by grand
jury and to trial by petit jury. Id. at 454.
40. Id. at 461.
41. Id. at 464. "The [U.S.] Constitution can have no operation in another coun-
try. When, therefore, the representatives or officers of [the U.S.] government are
permitted to exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on condi-
tions as the two countries may agree, the laws of neither one being obligatory upon
the other." Id.
42. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) (holding that fifth amend-
ment right to jury trial is inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (holding that right to indictment by grand jury is inapplicable in
Philippines); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding that jury
trial provision is applicable in Alaska); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149
(1904) (holding that right to jury trial inapplicable in Philippines); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 218-19 (1903) (White,J., concurring) (holding that constitu-
tional provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial do not apply in Hawaii);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that revenue clauses of Consti-
tution are inapplicable to Puerto Rico).
43. See U.S. Brief, supra note 27, at 19 (citing Examining Bd. of Engineers, Archi-
tects, and Surveyors v. Flores del Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599 n.30 (1976)). The Court
in the Insular Cases distinguished between "incorporated" territories, or territories
destined for statehood from the time of acquisition, and "unincorporated" territo-
ries, territories possessed not in anticipation of statehood. Id. The Court conferred
a lesser degree of constitutional protection to "unincorporated" territories, and held
that "only fundamental constitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants" of
"unincorporated territories." Id.
44. 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
45. Id. at 148; see Note, Unalienable Rights, supra note 15, at 655-56.
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United States, but may be limited by territorial restrictions.46
In 1950, the Court declined to extend the application of
the Constitution to aliens outside the United States in the case
of Johnson v. Eisentrager.47 Eisentrager involved German nation-
als who had been prosecuted and convicted in China by a U.S.
military commission. 48 They were charged with engaging in
military activity against the United States after Germany's un-
conditional surrender but while the war against Japan contin-
ued.4 ' The German nationals alleged that they had been de-
nied their constitutional right to a jury trial.5"
The Eisentrager Court explained that the extent of an
alien's relationship with the United States determines the
scope of constitutional rights that an alien enjoys.5 For exam-
ple, an alien with no relation to the United States is granted no
constitutional protection.52 The Court reasoned from this
premise that the rights granted to aliens increase as their rela-
tion to the United States increases.53 The Court then stated
that an alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction is a
particular relation which gives the judiciary the power to act.54
Because the enemy aliens were not present within U.S. juris-
diction, the Court concluded that it was not required to extend
the Constitution's protection to them.55 Using a territorial ap-
46. See Note, Unalienable Rights, supra note 15, at 656 (asserting that Insular Cases
hold that Bill of Rights applies to territories); Recent Development, supra note 5, at
830.
47. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
48. Id. at 765-66.
49. Id. at 766.
50. Id. at 767.
51. Id. at 770 (noting that aliens are accorded ascending scale of rights as their
identity with U.S. society increases).
52. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (noting that "Bill of Rights is
a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these [U.S.]
shores .... An alien obviously brings with him no constitutional rights, Congress
may exclude him in the first instance for whatever reason it sees fit").
53. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950).
54. Id. at 771.
55. Id. at 785; see United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) ("[U.S.]
Constitution, laws and policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of
[U.S.] citizens"); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 835 (1960) (asserting that nonresident aliens claiming injury from U.S. nu-
clear tests "plainly cannot appeal to the protection of the Constitution or laws of the
United States"); Stephan, supra note 19, at 782 ("foreign nationals abroad are
neither parties to nor beneficiaries of the agreement between the federal government
and its people embodied in the Constitution").
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plication of the Constitution, the Court thus denied the right
to a trial by jury to enemy aliens abroad.56
Later, in Reid v. Covert,5 7 the U.S. Supreme Court aban-
doned the strict territorial application articulated in Ross and
granted constitutional protections to citizens accompanying
the armed forces in foreign countries." The Court found that
the Constitution guarantees a trial by jury for a U.S. citizen
accompanying the U.S. armed forces outside the United
States.59
Justice Black, writing for the plurality in Reid, dismissed
the Ross case as "a relic from a different era."6 Justice Black
noted that a strict territorial approach had been directly repu-
diated by many federal courts, including several U.S. Supreme
Court cases.6 The Court found that U.S. citizens abroad were
protected by the Bill of Rights,6 finding the statute imposing
56. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 785. The Court held that "the Constitution does not
confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment
upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the
United States." Id.
57. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
58. Id. at 10-12. Reid v. Covert involved the power of Congress to expose U.S.
citizens accompanying U.S. military forces outside the United States to trial by mili-
tary tribunals under military regulations and procedures for offenses against the
United States. Id. at 3. In Reid, two cases involving the wives of U.S. military officers
who allegedly killed their husbands at military bases outside the United States were
consolidated. Id, Mrs. Covert allegedly killed her husband, Sergeant Covert, at an
Air Force base in England. Id. Mrs. Smith allegedly killed her husband, an Army
officer, at a post in Japan. Id. at 4. Although a military tribunal in England found
both guilty of murder pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court
held that a private U.S. citizen was entitled to a civil jury trial and could not constitu-
tionally be tried by military authorities. Id. at 5; see United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d
1258, 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979) (finding fourth amendment
protects U.S. citizens worldwide against unreasonable searches and seizures).
59. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18-19.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1921); Downes v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1900); Mitchell v. Harmony, 55 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134
(1851); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950); Eisentrager v. For-
restal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl.
1953)).
62. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). The Court reversed the military tribu-
nal's decision and rejected the idea that "when the United States acts against citizens
abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights." Id. Justice Black, writing for the
plurality, asserted that
[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
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trial by court martial unconstitutional.63
The application of the Constitution thus evolved from a
strict territorial approach for both citizens and aliens64 to an
extraterritorial application for citizens accompanying the
armed forces outside the United States. 65 The Reid decision
has since been applied to U.S. citizens outside the United
States.6 6 Many federal courts took the next step and extended
fourth amendment rights to aliens subjected to U.S. govern-
ment action outside the United States.67 In United States v.
limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches
out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.
Id.;at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 34-35. Traditionally, the options available in situations such as the
Reid case were to try the defendant by court martial or deliver the defendant to the
local authorities for prosecution under local law. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524
(1957).
64. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (stating that Constitution ordains
and establishes government for United States and not for other countries).
65. Reid, 354 U.S. at 35.
66. Since Reid, there has been a trend toward greater constitutional protection
abroad for citizens. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063
(1990) (recognizing implicitly that Reid applies not only to U.S. citizens accompany-
ing armed forces outside United States but also to other U.S. citizens by stating that
"[slince respondent is not a United States citizen, he can derive no comfort from the
Reid holding"); Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1235 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that Reid speaks only of extraterritorial rights of U.S. citizens), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1056 (1990); see also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
The Reid Court held that a dependent of a U.S. serviceman or civilian defense em-
ployee is protected by article III and the fifth and sixth amendments. Therefore, the
dependent could not be convicted outside the United States without a trial by jury for
a non-capital offense committed abroad. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAw § 721 comment b (1987) (stating that "constitution governs the exer-
cise of authority by the United States government over United States citizens outside
United States territory"); Note, Searching the World Over, supra note 15, at 495 (stating
that U.S. "courts will apply the exclusionary rule to evidence seized from United
States citizens by United States agents on foreign soil"); Note, Aliens Fourth Amendment
Rights Against Government Searches Abroad-United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856
F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989), 64 WASH. L. REV. 701
705 (1989) (stating that Reid is sound precedent for proposition that Constitution
protects citizens against U.S. governmental action outside United States); Note,
Fourth Amendment Constraints on United States Law Enforcement Agents Acting on Non-resident
Aliens and Their Property Abroad, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 27, 35 (1986) (noting
that Reid involved U.S. citizens abroad).
67. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 916-17 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
court suggested that the trend to relax the rigid standing requirements for non-resi-
dent aliens may indicate that non-resident aliens can invoke greater constitutional
protection. United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
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Verdugo-Urquidez, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented
squarely with this question.
II. UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
A. Factual Background
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the extraterritorial application of the fourth amend-
ment.68  The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (the
"DEA") filed a sealed complaint against Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California.69 The district court issued an arrest warrant for
Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez.70 The United States charged Rene
Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and resident of Mexico,7"
with criminal narcotics violations 72 and murder.73
450 U.S. 910 (1981) (assuming that fourth amendment protected both citizens and
aliens aboard vessel on high seas); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110-11 (5th
Cir. 1979) (noting that once aliens become subject to liability under U.S. law they
have right to fourth amendment protection); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227,
260 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (finding that alien civilians charged with non-military of-
fenses must be provided with same constitutional safeguards in U.S. court in Berlin
that are provided to civilian defendants in any other U.S. court).
68. 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1990).
69. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (9ih Cir.
1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). The charges included "numerous narcotics and
narcotics-related criminal violations including conspiracy to import multi-ton quanti-
ties of marijuana into the United States, possession with intent to distribute nlti-ton
quantities of marijuana, and engaging in an on-going criminal enterprise." Id. at
1215.
70. See id. at 1216; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107 (Crim.)
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1987), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 82a, United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353) [hereinafter Certi-
orari Petition].
71. See U.S. Reply Brief, supra note 27, at 4 n.3. Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez asserted
that at the time of the search, he was a "legal resident of the United States, Alien
Registration Number A19-978-670." Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at 3 n.2.
The U.S. government contended that this was the first time that Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez made such a claim. Id. at 4 n.3. The U.S. government also pointed out that
"although [Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez] apparently received a green card in 1970....
nothing in the record [suggested] that he had remained a resident alien since that
time." Id.
72. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1215.
73. Id. The DEA contended that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez participated in the tor-
ture and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. Id. Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez has since been convicted for his role in Agent Camarena's death and he was
sentenced to life imprisonment plus 240 years. See Feldman, Camarena's Killer Gets
240 Year Prison Term, L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1988, pt. 2, at 1, col. l;see also Lieberman,
Camarena Case Spotlight Shifts to L.A. Unit Tactics, L.A. Times, May 7, 1990, at AI, col. 5.
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Unable to locate Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in the United
States to execute the arrest warrant,"' DEA agents contacted
the U.S. Marshal Service (the "Marshal Service"). 75 The Mar-
shal Service in turn contacted Mexican law enforcement offi-
cials, who advised the Marshal Service that Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez could be arrested by Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(the "MFJP") in Mexico. 76 After receiving the U.S. warrant for
Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest, 77 Mexican officers arrested Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and took him to the Marshal Ser-
vice.78 At the United States-Mexico border, the Marshal Ser-
vice took custody of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, placed him under
arrest, and subsequently delivered him to the DEA. 79
Without seeking prior approval from any other U.S. au-
thorities, the DEA sought the Mexican government's permis-
sion to search Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali home.80 The
day after Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest, four DEA agents
drove to Mexicali, Mexico, and met with ten to fifteen Mexican
officers."' Together, they searched both of Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez's residences in Mexico. 2 The search disclosed a
74. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
7% Id. The DEA contacted the U.S. Marshal Service to determine whether Mex-
ican authorities could apprehend Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez at his Mexicali residence
and deliver him to the United States for trial. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Six Mexican officers stopped Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in San Felipi, Baja
California, Mexico while Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez was driving his car. Id. The officers
arrested, handcuffed, and took Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez to the Mexico-United States
border. Id. The Mexican officers never explained where they were taking Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez or why they arrested him. Id.
79. Id. The DEA in turn delivered Verdugo-Urquidez to the Metropolitan Cor-
rectional Center in San Diego, California. Id.
80. Id. at 1216 n.2; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107 (Crim.)
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 5 1987), reprinted in Certiorari Petition, supra note 70, at 85a. The
district court noted that "[p]rior to leaving the DEA office in Calexico, Bowen [the
Resident Agent in Charge of the DEA office in Calexico] did not contact the United
States Attorney's Office in San Diego or the Department ofJustice Office in Washing-
ton, D.C. in order to obtain authorization for the searches or to seek legal advice as
to their legality." Id. The DEA's express purpose in conducting searches of both Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez's residences was to obtain evidence to use against him in the
pending U.S. prosecution. Id. at 82a-83a; see Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1225.
81. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990); Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107 (Crim.) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5,
1987), reprinted in Certiorari Petition, supra note 70, at 85a.
82. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1216-17. The search occurred on the night of
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tally sheet reflecting quantities of marijuana that Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez allegedly smuggled into the United States."3 Before
trial, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez sought to suppress this evi-
dence.84
B. Procedural Background
In the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress all of the ev-
idence obtained from his home on the grounds that the evi-
dence was seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights.8
5
The district court granted Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's motion,
concluding that the fourth amendment applied to searches
conducted abroad.86 The district court found that the DEA
agents had failed to justify searching Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's
premises without a warrant.8 7 The district court also held that
even if a warrant were not required for this search, the search
was, nevertheless, unreasonable.88
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court.8 9 The court relied
January 25-26, 1986. Id. at 1226-27. At approximately 3:00 a.m. or 4:00 a.m. on
January 26, while DEA agents were sorting through several files that they found in a
cabinet in the back portion of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali house, a Mexican
official placed documents in a briefcase and handed the briefcase to a DEA agent. Id.
at 1227.
83. Id. at 1217.
84. See infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text (discussing procedural history
of case).
85. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107 (Crim.) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5,
1987), reprinted in Certiorari Petition, supra note 70; see Respondent's Brief, supra note
23, at 2.
86. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107(Crim.) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1987), reprinted in
Certiorari Petition, supra note 70, at 81a. The court found that the DEA's conduct
was unreasonable because the search was unconstitutionally general, the agents were
not limited by any precise written or oral descriptions of the type of documentary
evidence sought, the search occurred after 10 p.m., and the DEA failed to leave a
contemporaneous inventory of the evidence seized. Id. at 102a.
87. Id. at 93a-101a. The district court held that the agents were required to
secure a warrant before conducting the searches. Id. at 100a. The court explained
that the Mexican Constitution "seems to require ... a warrant similar to that re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 93a-94a.
88. Id. at 10la-102a.
89. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1230 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). The Ninth Circuit found that the search violated the
Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment, and thus it never reviewed the district
court's alternative holding that the search was unreasonable even if no warrant were
required. Id.
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on the natural rights theory to explain the constitutional rights
of aliens, and on Reid v. Covert to apply these rights outside the
United States.90 The court stated that all persons possess ina-
lienable natural rights that are not subject to government vio-
lation.9' The Ninth Circuit concluded in Verdugo-Urquidez that
non-resident aliens have a fourth amendment right to chal-
lenge U.S. government actions abroad.92
The court found support in Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Lopez-Mendoza9" for the proposition that illegal aliens
present within the United States have fourth amendment
rights.94 In Lopez-Mendoza, illegal aliens sought to invoke the
exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings.95 The Court
held that deportation hearings are not criminal proceedings,96
and application of the exclusionary rule was therefore inappro-
priate.97 The Court suggested, however, that fourth amend-
ment protections apply to aliens in criminal proceedings.98
The court of appeals in Verdugo-Urquidez therefore reasoned
that if illegal aliens within the United States possess fourth
amendment rights, an alien like Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, who is
involuntarily present in the United States should also possess
90. Id. at 1218-20. The Ninth Circuit based its holding partly on the Reid
Court's grant of extraterritorial protection to U.S. citizens abroad. Id. at 1218; see
supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text (discussing Reid).
91. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1219-20.
92. Id. at 1218.
93. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
94. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discussing Lopez-Mendoza), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
95. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034.
96. Id. at 1038.
97. Id. at 1040-50.
98. Id. at 1050. Eight out of nine justices in Lopez-Mendoza suggested that the
fourth amendment applies to illegal aliens. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1223. A
plurality of the Court stated, "We do not condone any violations of the Fourth
Amendment that may have occurred in the arrest[] of... Lopez-Mendoza .... Our
conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change, if there devel-
oped good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were
widespread." Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. In their dissenting opinions, four
other justices also expressed the view that illegal aliens have fourth amendment
rights. See id. at 1051 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating that "[iun this case, federal law
enforcement officers arrested [Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval Sanchez] in violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights"); id. at 1055 (White,J., dissenting) (stating that ille-
gal aliens often do not challenge fourth amendment violations because aliens are
removed from United States once U.S. government improperly obtains illegal evi-
dence against them); id. at 1060 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (recognizing fourth amend-
ment rights of illegal aliens).
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these rights. 99
The Ninth Circuit majority rejected the compact theory'0 0
espoused by the dissent,' 0 ' and found that fourth amendment
protection extended to the government's search of Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali residence. 0 2  The court de-
scribed the case as a "joint venture"'0 3 in which the DEA con-
trolled the operation. 0 4 In the absence of a search warrant or
exigent circumstances, the search was therefore unlawful. 0 5
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the District
Court properly suppressed the evidence obtained in the
search.'0 6 The U.S. government petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court to review the decision under a writ of certiorari.' 0 7 The
Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of certio-
rari.108
99. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
100. Id. at 1218-21 (acknowledging that U.S. Supreme Court has used compact
theory to explain aspects of federalism, but not to define extraterritorial reach of
Constitution).
101. Id. at 1231-36 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on Curtiss- Wright
and Eisentrager to argue that the government is not restrained by the Constitution
when it acts against aliens outside the United States. Id.
102. Id. at 1227.
103. Id. at 1228. The court noted that U.S. authorities planned and instigated
the search to obtain evidence for the U.S. trial, that the U.S. agents' activity took
place before, during, and after the search. Id. The court also noted that the Mexican
authorities informed U.S. agents before the search that the United States could keep
evidence seized. Id. Finally, the court said that U.S. agents not only asked for assist-
ance from Mexican authorities but asked for permission to conduct their own opera-
tion. Id.; see United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding
joint venture where U.S. agents' role was not subordinate to rule of foreign police);
United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1978). The Emery Court
found that there was a joint venture where U.S. agents informed foreign authorities
of a possible drug smuggling transaction in foreign territory, planted undercover
U.S. agent in the foreign territory, coordinated surveillance of the suspected site, and
gave prearranged signal for the foreign police to move in and make the arrest. Id. at
1268.
104. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
105. Id. at 1230.
106. Id.
107. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
108. Id.
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III. THE REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion of ChiefJustice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia, reversed the decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 109 The plural-
ity concluded that the fourth amendment does not apply to
searches conducted abroad by U.S. agents of the property of
an alien who lacks sufficient connection to the United States. "o
The plurality, relying primarily on Eisentrager and the Insu-
lar Cases, considered the extraterritorial application of the
fourth amendment and focused on three factors."' The plu-
rality first looked at the significance of the location of the con-
stitutional violation." t 2 The plurality then focused on the his-
torical significance of the words "the people" as used in the
fourth amendment.' Finally, the plurality established the re-
quirement that a defendant have voluntary, sufficient connec-
tion with the United States." 4
The plurality began its analysis by stressing that the place
where an alleged constitutional violation occurs is signifi-
cant.' To illustrate this point, the Court contrasted the
fourth and fifth amendments." 6 While a fourth amendment
violation occurs wherever the unreasonable governmental in-
trusion takes place, a fifth amendment violation occurs only at
trial." 7 Thus, if the United States violated Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez's fourth amendment rights, the violation occurred
109. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990).
110. Id. at 1060-66.
111. See infra notes 112-43 and accompanying text (discussing three factors plu-
rality considered).
112. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
113. Id. at 1060-66; see infra notes 120-25. For the text of the fourth amend-
ment, see supra note 1.
114. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061 & 1066 (1990).
115. See id. at 1061; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). The
Court emphasized that a violation of the fourth amendment "is fully accomplished"
wherever the unreasonable governmental intrusion takes place.
116. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060 (characterizing fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination as fundamental trial right of criminal defendants).
117. Id. The plurality noted, however, that the fifth amendment was not at issue
in this case. Id.; see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (noting that
conduct by U.S. law enforcement officials prior to trial may impair fifth amendment
right, but constitutional violation occurs only at trial). For the text of the fifth amend-
ment, see supra note 9.
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"solely" in Mexico." 8 The U.S. Constitution, therefore, could
not apply to Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez in light of his attenuated
relationship to the United States." 9
In its interpretation of the history of the fourth amend-
ment, 20 the plurality found significance in the textual refer-
ence to "the people" in the fourth amendment as opposed to
"persons" in the fifth and sixth amendments.' 2' In drawing
this "people-person distinction," the plurality opined that the
Framers did not use different words merely to avoid redun-
dancy in the text. 122 Rather, the plurality determined that the
Framers used "the people" to provide protection only to "the
people" of the United States. 21 Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez,
therefore, could be given protection only if he was one of "the
people" of the United States. 124 The plurality concluded that
the fourth amendment was never intended to restrain the ac-
tions of the federal government outside the United States. 25
The plurality found additional support for denying the ex-
traterritorial application of the fourth amendment in Johnson v.
Eisentrager.126 In Eisentrager, the Court held that enemy aliens
arrested and imprisoned outside the United States after World
War II could not obtain writs of habeas corpus in U.S. federal
118. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1060; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 906 (1984) ("wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment is 'fully accom-
plished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself"); see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354
("wrong [condemned by fourth amendment] is fully accomplished by the original
search without probable cause").
119. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
120. Id. at 1061 (finding no indication that framers of U.S. Constitution under-
stood fourth amendment as restraint on U.S. government's action against aliens
outside United States).
121. Id. at 1060-61. The plurality noted that "the people" seems to have been a
term of art employed in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution and in the first, sec-
ond, fourth, ninth, and tenth amendments to refer to a class of persons who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
the United States to be considered a part of the United States. Id. at 1061. "Person,"
on the other hand, was used in the fifth and sixth amendments to regulate criminal
procedure. Id.
122. Id. at 1060 (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union,
at 12 n.4, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (No. 88-1353)).
123. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
124. Id. This conclusion is grounded in the theory that the Constitution is a
social contract or compact that protects only those who are parties to it. See supra
notes 19-29 and accompanying text (discussing social contract or compact theory).
125. Id. at 1061.
126. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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courts.' 27 The Verdugo-Urquidez plurality reasoned that if the
fifth amendment, which addresses the relatively universal cate-
gory of "persons," does not extend outside the United
States, 28 there is great reason to find that the fourth amend-
ment, limited only to "the people," also does not apply beyond
the United States.' 2
9
Furthermore, the plurality found that the history of the
fourth amendment suggests that the Framers sought to restrict
searches and seizures occurring in domestic and not foreign
matters. 30 The plurality found that the fourth amendment's
historical background did not suggest that it was intended to
restrain the actions of the federal government against aliens in
foreign territory or in international waters. 3
Additionally, the plurality distinguished Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez from the category of aliens who enjoy certain consti-
tutional rights by establishing a sufficient connection test. 32
Accordingly, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to fourth
amendment protection only if he attained a sufficient connec-
tion with the United States. 33 The plurality found that Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez did not have sufficient connections."' The
plurality's basis for this finding was the involuntary nature of
Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's presence in the United States as well
127. Id. at 784. For a discussion of Eisentrager, see supra notes 47-56 and accom-
panying text.
128. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063 (1990) (claiming
that Eisentrager stands for proposition that aliens are not entitled to fifth amendment
rights outside United States).
129. Id. The plurality states that "[i]f such is true of the Fifth Amendment,
which speaks in the relatively universal term of 'person,' it would seem even more
true with respect to the Fourth Amendment, which applies only to 'the people.' " Id.
130. Id. at 1061.
131. Id. at 1061-62; see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) (involving seizure of French vessels during "un-
declared war" with France in 1798 and 1799). The plurality cited Talbot, stating that
the Court "never suggested that the Fourth Amendment restrained the authority of
Congress or of U.S. agents to conduct operations" against foreign nationals. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1062.
132. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
133. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1236 (9th Cir.
1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). judge Wallace stated
that "some measure of allegiance to the United States, as evidenced by citizenship or
residency, is the quid pro quo for receiving the privilege of invoking our Bill of
Rights as a check on the extraterritorial actions of United States officials." Id.
134. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
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as the location of the search outside the United States. 35
The plurality also reasoned that the application of the
fourth amendment to searches conducted abroad could have
serious consequences for U.S. agents conducting activities be-
yond U.S. borders.' 3 6 Moreover, the plurality was concerned
that applying the fourth amendment in situations where the
U.S. government employed armed forces outside its borders
would disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to
foreign situations involving national interest. 37
Furthermore, the plurality was concerned that granting
Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez fourth amendment protection in this
case would provide aliens who had no prior connection to the
United States with a cause of action for alleged violations oc-
curring in foreign countries.138 The plurality noted that recog-
nizing such a cause of action would raise serious separation of
powers problems by entangling the judiciary in the powers of
the executive and the legislature.' 39 The plurality pointed out
that situations involving foreign searches of non-resident
aliens would likely involve "special factors counselling hesita-
tion," and the courts, therefore, could not create a cause of
action.' 40 Nevertheless, the U.S. government would still be re-
quired to make a case-by-case inquiry into the availability of
135. Id. (rejecting Justice Stevens' assertion that "lawful but involuntary" pres-
ence was sufficient to satisfy "substantial connection" test); see Verdugo-Urquidez, 856
F.2d at 1238 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (finding that "[a]bsent an intention to form
bonds with the United States, no constitutional compact can be fairly implied"). But
see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). The Mathews Court noted that
[t]here are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, pro-
tects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protec-
tion.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066; see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950).
137. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1065.
138. Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). A Bivens action is ajudicially created remedy that allows an
injured party to claim damages from U.S. officials for violations of the Constitution.
Id.
139. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,. 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1065 (1990).
140. Cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (refusing to create Bivens
remedy for allegedly unconstitutional termination of Social Security disability bene-
fits); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1983) (refusing to create Bivens rem-
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such an action. 14
Finally, the plurality contended that applying the fourth
amendment to aliens abroad would require the legislative and
executive branches of the U.S. government to determine what
might be reasonable in searches and seizures abroad. 142 The
plurality, therefore, declined to place restrictions on the power
of U.S. agents to conduct searches and seizures outside the
United States where the political branches have declined to act
through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation. 143
The Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza mis-
placed. 144 The court of appeals relied on Lopez-Mendoza as sup-
port for the proposition that the fourth amendment rights re-
served to "the people" are possessed by undocumented aliens
within the United States. 145 The plurality, however, rejected
the Ninth Circuit's application of the Lopez-Mendoza holding. 14 6
The plurality stated that Lopez-Mendoza did not encompass the
issue of whether the fourth amendment extended to illegal
aliens in the United States.' 47 According to the Court, Lopez-
edy against U.S. military officers for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of soldiers,
based upon special circumstances inherent in military context).
141. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1065.
142. Id. at 1065-66 (noting that applying fourth amendment to extraterritorial
searches would "plunge [executive and legislative branches] into a sea of uncertainty
as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted
abroad").
143. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1066.
144. Id. at 1064-65; see Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that fourth amendment exclusionary rule does
not apply in deportation proceeding); see also supra note 96 (noting that eight of nine
justices and the Solicitor General in Lopez-Mendoza believed that illegal aliens have
fourth amendment rights when in United States). Courts, therefore, deem an alien's
presence within the United States as sufficient justification to demand an alien's ame-
nability to U.S. laws and in return U.S. courts extend protections under those laws.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 211 n.10, 215 (1982) (aliens in United States are subject to U.S. criminal and
civil laws and consequently afforded certain constitutional protections).
145. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
146. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064-65 (1990). The
Court further stated that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez had no voluntary connection to the
United States and therefore was not among the people protected by the Constitution.
Id. at 1064. The plurality distinguished Lopez-Mendoza because the aliens seeking
constitutional protection in that case were in the United States voluntarily and thus
had accepted societal obligations. Id. at 1065.
147. Id. at 1064.
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Mendoza only addressed whether the fourth amendment's ex-
clusionary rule applied to civil deportation proceedings rather
than criminal proceedings. 48
Further, the Court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of Reid v. Covert as standing for the proposition
that the fourth amendment constrains U.S. federal officials
wherever and against whomever they act.' 49 The Court con-
tended that the Ninth Circuit's "global" application of the
Constitution was inconsistent with the Insular Cases.'5 0 In the
Insular Cases, the Court noted that some but not all constitu-
tional provisions apply to U.S. governmental activity in places
where the United States has sovereign power.' 5 ' The Court
reasoned that because the United States exercises no sovereign
power in Mexico, there was little basis for applying the Consti-
tution to the search of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexicali resi-
dence. 52
B. The Concurring Opinions
1. Concurring Opinion of Justice Kennedy
Although Justice Kennedy agreed that no fourth amend-
ment violation occurred in Verdugo-Urquidez, he explicitly re-
jected the plurality's use of the "people-person" distinction. 153
Justice Kennedy also doubted the validity of a strict interpreta-
tion of the Constitution as a social compact. 154 Instead, Justice
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1063; see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing Reid
case).
150. Verdugo-Urquidez, I 10 S. Ct. at 1062; see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying
text (discussing Insular Cases). See generally Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Terri-
torial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 823 (1926); Langdell, The Status of Our New
Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1899); Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV.
464 (1899).
151. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1062 (1990) (citing
Insular Cases).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1066-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated, "I cannot
place any weight on the reference to 'the people' in the Fourth Amendment as a
source of restricting its protections. With respect, I submit these words do not de-
tract from its force or its reach." Id. at 1067.
154. Id. at 1066-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITtrIoN OF THE UNITED STATES § 153-62 (1987) (reprint of 1st ed. 1833). Jus-
tice Story cast considerable doubts on the validity of the compact theory in stating
that "there is very strong negative testimony against the notion of [the Constitution]
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Kennedy suggested that a case-by-case analysis should apply in
cases of extraterritorial searches.' 55 The analysis would focus
on which constitutional guarantees should apply in light of the
particular circumstances and practical considerations of the
case. "'5 6 Justice Kennedy stated that restrictions on the activi-
ties of U.S. agents concerning aliens outside the United States
should be based on the Constitution's general principles. 57
In applying this approach, Justice Kennedy considered the
alienage of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez,158 the location of the
search, 59 and the nature of the warrant requirement. 60  After
noting that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez was an alien, and that the
warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico, Justice Ken-
nedy found no fourth amendment violation.' 6'
Finally, Justice Kennedy considered whether Verdugo-
Urquidez's due process rights had been violated. 6 2 Because
the court where Verdugo-Urquidez would be prosecuted was
being a compact .. .founded upon the known history of the time, and the acts of
ratification, as well as upon the antecedent articles of confederation." Id. § 158.
155. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid).
Justice Harlan stated that constitutional protections do not necessarily apply in all
circumstances in every foreign country. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
157. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1067 (1990) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (stating that constitutional protections must be interpreted "in
light of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legiti-
mate power and authority abroad").
158. Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that in cases involving ap-
plication of Constitution, Court has considered whether person claiming its protec-
tion is citizen or alien); see Reid, 354 U.S. 1; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950).
159. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Reid). Justice Harlan stated: "I cannot agree with the suggestion that every provision
of the Constitution must always be deemed automatically applicable to American citi-
zens in every part of the world .... [T]here are provisions in the Constitution which
do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place." Reid, 354 U.S. at
74 (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing
Reid case).
161. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy noted that, "[tihe absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue
warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness
and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials all
indicate that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement should not apply in Mex-
ico as it does in this country." Id.
162. Id. at 1068 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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established under article III of the U.S. Constitution, all trial
proceedings would be governed by the Constitution. 163 Thus,
the dictates of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
would protect Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez.' 4 Justice Kennedy,
therefore, concluded that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's due pro-
cess rights were not violated by the search.'
65
2. Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens disagreed with the plurality's definition of
"the people" and found that "the people" included aliens law-
fully present in the United States. 166 Justice Stevens con-
cluded, however, that while Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez was one of
"the people" entitled to fourth amendment protection, he was
not entitled to the protection of the Warrant Clause. 167 Justice
Stevens focused instead on the reasonableness of the
search,' 6 and concluded that it was reasonable because it was
conducted by the United States in cooperation with Mexican
authorities. 169
163. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that court where Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez would be prosecuted is established under article III of Constitution, all trial
proceedings are governed by Constitution, and dictates of Due Process Clause of
fifth amendment protect him).
166. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
167. Id. Justice Stevens found that the Warrant Clause was inapplicable to for-
eign searches because U.S. magistrates have no power to authorize such searches. Id.
A search warrant is "[a]n order in writing, issued by a justice or other magistrate, in
the name of the state, directed to ... [an] officer, authorizing him to search for and
seize any property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a crime, contra-
band, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed .... BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1350 (6th ed. 1990); see FFD. R. CRIM. P. 41(a), 18 U.S.C. app.
(1988) (limiting magistrates and judges to issuing warrants for searches within their
district).
168. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1068 (1990) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
169. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). But see United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d
1258, 1265 (5th Cir.) (noting that "mere consent of foreign authorities to a seizure
that would be unconstitutional in the United States does not dissipate its illegality
even though the search would be valid under local law"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831
(1979).
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C. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented
from the plurality's holding. 170 Justice Brennan rejected the
contours of the "sufficient connection" test adopted by the
plurality.17' He contended that the plurality failed to recog-
nize the reciprocal nature of the U.S. government's ability to
impose its criminal law on others. 72
Justice Brennan suggested that the principles of mutuality
and fundamental fairness 7 3 required that the "connection" of
the U.S. government to the criminal defendant was the appro-
priate focus of the sufficient connection test. 1 74 Justice Bren-
nan disagreed with the Court's finding that an alien must be
voluntarily present in the United States.' 75 He argued that an
alien present in the United States awaiting criminal prosecu-
tion in a U.S. federal court accepted ample societal obligations
to satisfy the plurality's sufficient connection test. 176
Additionally, Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's limi-
tation on the class of persons who may assert fourth amend-
ment protections. 77 Justice Brennan redefined the term "the
people" as "the governed."'' 78 His definition recognized the
natural rights theory, but also required that Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez have some connection with the United States or that
170. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the plurality's suf-
ficient connection test, see supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 1069-70 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating that "Fourth Amendment is
an unavoidable correlative of the Government's power to enforce the criminal law").
173. Justice Brennan noted that "[m]utuality is essential to ensure the funda-
mental fairness that underlies our Bill of Rights." Id. at 1071. He further observed
that respecting the rights of foreign nationals encourages other nations to respect the
rights of U.S. citizens. Id.
174. Id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[riespondent is enti-
tled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment because our government has
treated him as a member of our community for the purposes of enforcing our laws").
175. Id. at 1070 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that this
requirement had been previously rejected by the Court. Id.; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
176. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1070 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1073 (noting that fourth amendment focuses on what U.S. govern-
ment can and cannot do, rather than against whom U.S. government action may be
taken).
178. Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the Unifed States have some connection with Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez. 79 Justice Brennan, therefore, stopped short of
adopting the proposition that constitutional rights must be ac-
corded to persons everywhere.' 80
In support of this alternative definition of "the people,"
Justice Brennan argued that the Bill of Rights did not bestow
rights upon individuals, but acknowledged the existence of
rights that inhered in each person.' 8 ' He concluded that the
Bill of Rights, rather than establishing new rights applicable
only to citizens, prohibited the U.S. government from infring-
ing on these pre-existing rights and liberties.'8 2
Further, Justice Brennan argued that the drafting history
of the fourth amendment did not support the plurality's inter-
pretation of the term "the people."183 Rather, Justice Brennan
found that the fourth amendment was grounded in the natural
rights theory. 84 Justice Brennan contended that the conduct
of the U.S. government in Verdugo-Urquidez ignored the notion
of fundamental fairness. 8 5  According to Justice Brennan,
when the United States imposed a societal obligation to com-
179. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 15 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing natural rights theory).
180. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1072 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1073 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Respondent's Brief, supra note 23,
at 16.
182. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1073 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1073-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting). First, the drafters of the fourth
amendment rejected limiting the applicability of the fourth amendment to "citizens,"
"freemen," "residents," or "American people." Id. at 1073. Second, during Con-
gressional and Senate consideration, no speaker or commentator even referred to
the term "the people" as a limitation. Id. at 1074. Finally, none of the cases relied
on by the plurality purports to read the phrase "the people" as limiting the protec-
tion to those with "sufficient connection" to the United States. Id.
184. Id. at 1072-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The natural rights theory perme-
ates early U.S. political documents. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence (U.S.
1776), reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
251-55 (1971). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 170 (1968); II J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW (1827).
185. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
fundamental fairness and ideals underlying Bill of Rights compel conclusion that
fourth amendment protects those subject to U.S. criminal laws). Justice Brennan ob-
served that the behavior of U.S. law enforcement agents abroad sends a strong
message about the rule of law to individuals everywhere. He noted that "[i]f we seek
respect for law and order, we must observe these principles ourselves. Lawlessness
breeds lawlessness." Id.
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ply with U.S. criminal law on Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, the
United States became obliged to respect certain correlative
rights, among them Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's fourth amend-
ment rights.8 6
Justice Brennan recognized the strong probability that
cases would come before the federal courts involving interna-
tional criminal conspiracy. 187 In these cases citizens and for-
eign nationals may be co-defendants, charged under the same
statute for the same illegal conduct."8 Where the U.S. govern-
ment holds foreign co-defendants to the same standard of con-
duct, Justice Brennan argued that withholding the use of the
exclusionary rule from aliens and granting it to citizens sets up
an unacceptable double standard of justice.18 9
Finally, Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality's
opinion that the Warrant Clause was only applicable to domes-
tic searches.' 90 He recognized that there is no statutory au-
thority for the issuance of a warrant for a foreign search, and
even if such a warrant were issued, it would have no force in
the country where the search occurred.' 9 ' Justice Brennan,
nevertheless, concluded that the Warrant Clause must be ap-
plied to both domestic and foreign searches to assure determi-
nation by a neutral, detached magistrate.
92
186. Id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez; 856
F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez was awaiting
trial on twenty counts of forty-one-count indictment returned against him and thirty-
eight other defendants), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
189. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, I 10 S. Ct. 1056, 1071 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 721 (1987). The Restatement (Third) states that
the provisions of the United States Constitution safeguarding individual
rights generally control the United States government in the conduct of its
foreign relations as well as in domestic matters, and generally limit govern-
mental authority whether it is exercised in the United States or abroad, and
whether such authority is exercised unilaterally or by international agree-
ment.
Id.
190. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1075-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 (1987).
191. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1077 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1076 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 222 (1981) (stating that "inconvenience incurred by the police [in obtaining
warrant] is simply not that significant").
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2. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Blackmun
AlthoughJustice Blackmun adopted Justice Brennan's def-
inition of "the people" as "the governed," he rejected Justice
Brennan's suggestion that the fourth amendment potentially
governs every action by U.S. officials abroad that can be char-
acterized as a search or seizure. 193 Rather, Justice Blackmun
found that an alien is only entitled to fourth amendment pro-
tection when a U.S. official exercises sovereign authority over
him.' 94 Justice Blackmun, therefore, contended that because
U.S. officials exercised sovereign authority over Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez and held him accountable for violations of U.S. law,
he was treated as one of "the governed" and entitled to fourth
amendment protection. 95
In finding that the Warrant Clause was not applicable to
foreign searches, 196 Justice Blackmun considered whether
probable cause existed to render the search of Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez's home reasonable. 97 Unconvinced that this issue
had been properly addressed, Justice Blackmun would have va-
cated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case for further proceedings.' 9 8
IV. THE PLURALITY'S DECISION IN VERDUGO-
URQUIDEZ IS MISGUIDED
The Verdugo-Urquidez plurality primarily relied on three
factors in holding that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, a non-resident
alien involuntarily present in the United States, was not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment.199 The plurality's opinion is
misguided for several reasons. The opinion relies on the sig-
nificance of the "people-person distinction," yet the plurality
admitted that the distinction is inconclusive.2 °0 Moreover, the
unilateral focus of the plurality's sufficient connection test is
193. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1077-78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199. See supra notes 111-43 and accompanying text (discussing three factors re-
lied on by plurality).
200. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061 (1990); see infra
notes 203-17 and accompanying text (discussing "people-person distinction").
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inconsistent with the principles of mutuality and fundamental
fairness. 20 1 Furthermore, the plurality's reliance on the Insular
Cases and Johnson v. Eisentrager is misplaced and its interpreta-
tion of these cases is inconsistent with the Court's Reid v. Covert
decision .202
Substantial support existed for the extension of the pro-
tection of the fourth amendment to Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez.
Instead, the plurality adopted a constitutional standard that
permits U.S. agents to disregard the rights of non-resident
aliens abroad who lack sufficient connections to the United
States.
A. The Plurality's Sufficient Connection Test Is Flawed
The plurality formulated the sufficient connection test to
determine who falls within the category of "the people" de-
serving of fourth amendment protection.20 3 This test, how-
ever, is flawed because it is erroneously based on the premise
that an important distinction exists between the terms "the
people" and "persons." Furthermore, the plurality failed to
define clearly the terms "connection" and "sufficient.- 20 4
Moreover, the plurality's emphasis on an individual's connec-
201. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071-72 (Brennan, J. dissenting). In sev-
eral cases, however, the Court applied a connection test which had a unilateral focus
to determine whether the U.S. federal securities laws applied in foreign countries.
International Inves. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding in case
where U.S. nationality of issuer and consummation of transaction in United States
were factors strongly supporting application of U.S. securities laws to foreigners who
purchased U.S. securities); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In Bersch, the court held that the federal securities
laws were applicable to the sales of securities to U.S. residents in the United States
whether or not acts of material importance occurred in the United States. Id. at 993.
The court held further that the securities laws applied to U.S. residents abroad only if
acts of material importance occurred in the United States and significantly contrib-
uted to losses. Id. Finally, the court found that the federal securities laws did not
apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the U.S. where acts in the
United States did not directly cause such losses. Id.; Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (sustaining subject
matter jurisdiction over transaction in securities of foreign issuer consummated
outside United States where many acts of deception occurred in United States).
202. See infra notes 239-57 and accompanying text (discussing apparent retreat
to territorial approach to constitutional protection).
203. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
204. Id. at 1061; see supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (discussing plu-,
rality's sufficient connection test).
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tion to the United States is inappropriate.20 5
The test assumes that reference to "the people" in the
fourth amendment, as opposed to "persons" in the fifth and
sixth amendments, signifies an intent to limit the reach of the
fourth amendment. Yet the plurality explicitly admits that the
significance of this textual reference is inconclusive.2 °6
Indeed, the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected a tex-
tual approach to fourth amendment analysis. In Katz v. United
States,2 °7 the FBI gathered evidence against Katz by attaching
an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
the telephone booth from which he routinely placed calls. 0 8
The Court rejected the government's argument that use of the
device did not constitute a search because the device did not
physically enter the telephone booth.20 9 In Katz, the Court
abandoned the textual theory that property law controls fourth
amendment analysis.2 10 Rather, the Court concluded that "the
fourth amendment protects people, not places" against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.21 '
Nevertheless, the plurality relies on this distinction to for-
mulate the sufficient connection test.21 2 It seems doubtful that
the drafters of the Bill of Rights meant to distinguish people
205. See infra notes 214-29 and accompanying text (discussing plurality's unilat-
eral focus in evaluating Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's "connection" to United States).
206. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061 (1990).
207. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, a bookmaker was convicted of conducting
gambling activities across state lines in violation of a federal statute. Id. at 348.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 352.
210. Id. at 352-53. Previously, the Court had developed a body of case law sup-
porting a textual approach to the fourth amendment through a property law analysis.
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (holding that use of
"spike mike" to listen to conversations inside house constituted search because spike
mike physically intruded on petitioner's property); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942) (finding that placement of dictaphone on outside of wall did
not constitute search because there was no physical trespass by dictaphone); Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928) (holding that fourth
amendment is limited to searches and seizures of tangible property and absence of
penetration of such property forecloses further inquiry).
211. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
212. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061 (1990). In dis-
cussing the drafting of the fourth amendment, the plurality found that the purpose of
the fourth amendment was to restrict searches and seizures conducted by U.S. agents
in the United States. The plurality found no historical evidence to support the prop-
osition that the fourth amendment was intended to restrain U.S. agents acting against
aliens outside the United States. Id. at 1061-62.
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and persons.2 1 Even if the drafters did intend to distinguish
between people and persons, the Katz Court rejected a strict
territorial interpretation in an effort to accomplish the fourth
amendment's ideals.
Additionally, the plurality's sufficient connection test uni-
laterally focused on an individual's connection to the United
States without regard for the U.S. government actions taken
against the individual.2 14 In adopting this unilateral focus, the
plurality implicitly adhered to compact theory principles. 2 ' 5
The basic principle of the compact theory is that only the par-
ties to the Constitution have enforceable rights under it.2 1 6
Similarly, under the plurality's sufficient connection test only
persons who reside in the United States or who have devel-
oped sufficient connection to the United States are protected
by the fourth amendment. 21 7 The plurality, therefore, consid-
ered only Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's connections to the United
States without regard for the connection of the United States
with Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez.
The Supreme Court had used the compact theory in Ross
to explain that the Constitution does not apply to the extrater-
ritorial acts of the federal government.2 8 However, in light of
the historical background of the Bill of Rights 2 9 and Reid v.
213. See I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 440-66 (J. Gales ed. 1834). In introducing the
Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives onJune 8, 1789,James Madison stated
that "[i]t may be said, in some instances, [the Bill of Rights does] no more than state
the perfect equality of mankind. This to be sure, is an absolute truth, yet it is not
absolutely necessary to be inserted at the head of the Constitution." Id. at 454. Fur-
ther, Mr. Madison speaks throughout of the liberty of the people or the rights of the
people as if people were merely the plural of person. See id. at 448-55.
Additionally, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 speaks generally of the
rights of the people, but section 10, which states that general warrants "are grievous
and oppressive" and may be fairly considered an antecedent of the fourth amend-
ment, uses "person or persons." N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79-105 (1937).
214. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral focus of
definition of connection in plurality's sufficient connection test).
215. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061 (1990); see Re-
cent Development, supra note 5, at 833.
216. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text (discussing social contract or
compact theory).
217. Vlerdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
218. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
219. See supra note 213 (discussing statements made at introduction of Bill of
Rights to Congress). James Madison spoke out against the Alien and Sedition Acts
less than a decade after the adoption of the fourth amendment and stated that
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Covert,2 2 ° strict adherence to the compact theory is at least
questionable. Moreover, the compact analysis fails to recon-
cile granting constitutional rights to aliens who are within the
United States illegally with the denial of rights to aliens invol-
untarily present in the United States.22'
Justice Brennan recognized the flaws in the plurality's con-
sideration of an individual's connection to the United States
without regard for the actions of U.S. agents, and strict adher-
ence to the compact theory. 222 For Justice Brennan, the suffi-
cient connection test and the natural rights theory were not
mutually exclusive. 223  He criticized the plurality's unilateral
focus, suggesting instead a bilateral approach.224 Implicitly ac-
cepting an inquiry into an individual's connection to the
United States, Justice Brennan also required an inquiry into
the connection of the United States to the individual. 2 5
Moreover, Justice Brennan contended that the plurality ig-
nored Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's most obvious connection with
the United States.226 Specifically, Mexican agents investigated
Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez and forcibly took him to the United
States under the direction of DEA agents.227 He was to be
prosecuted for violations of U.S. law and would likely spend
the rest of his life in a U.S. prison.228 Indeed, the plurality rec-
ognized the possibility of long term U.S. imprisonment but
"[a]liens are not more parties to the laws than they are parties to the Constitution;
yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience,
they are entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage." Madison's Report on
the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 556 (2d ed. 1836).
220. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
221. See supra notes 25-60 (discussing constitutional protections granted to ille-
gal aliens); supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing Lopez-Mendoza).
222. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1072 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); see Note, The Constitutional Rights of Nonresident Aliens Prosecuted in
the United States, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 221, 232 (1980) (suggesting that criminal de-
fendants are parties to constitutional contract).
223. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1070-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 1068-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If the Constitution is viewed as a
contract between the people and the government, Justice Brennan considered the
government's imposition of its criminal laws on an individual as treating that individ-
ual as one of its people. Id. at 1075.
226. Id. at 1070 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez has been sen-
tenced to life plus 240 years. Feldman, Camarena's Killer Gets 240 Year Prison Term,
L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 1988, pt. 2, at 1, col. 1.
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chose not to consider it.229
Justice Brennan relied on constitutional history to support
his bilateral approach.2 30 He contended that the reach of the
Bill of Rights should focus on the actions of the U.S. govern-
ment, not on the residence or nationality of those whose rights
have been allegedly violated.
Furthermore, the plurality's sufficient connection test fails
to define clearly what factors are necessary to satisfy the suffi-
ciency requirement. 231 At different points, the plurality noted
particular connections that would satisfy its test. 23 2 The plural-
ity suggested, for example, that an alien must be voluntarily
present in the United States and must have accepted some so-
cietal obligations.233 Interestingly, none of the cases cited by
the plurality require voluntary presence before granting con-
stitutional protection.23 4 At another point, the plurality im-
plied that if the places searched were in the United States, Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez would have been protected by the fourth
amendment.23 5
Beyond an alien's voluntary presence in the United States
or a search conducted in the United States, the plurality left
scant guidelines to determine what other types of connections
would be sufficient to satisfy its test.236 Indeed, in determin-
ing whether Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's connections were suffi-
cient, the plurality seemed unclear about the precise contours
of the test.237
The plurality found that Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez's involun-
229. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990) (stating
that "extent to which [Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez] might claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States were to be pro-
longed-by a prison sentence, for example-we need not decide").
230. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of
considering government's conduct under natural rights theory to determine whether
constitutional protection should be granted); supra notes 217-26 and accompanying
text (discussing flaws in strict compact theory analysis).
231. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text (discussing sufficient connec-
tion test).
232. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1070 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1060; id. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 1064.
237. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text (discussing plurality's appar-
ent use of "substantial" connection requirement for Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez rather
than "sufficient" connection).
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tary presence did not indicate any "substantial" connection
with the United States. 23 1 The significance of the plurality's
use of the term substantial to fulfill the sufficient connection
test is not addressed. Did the plurality impose a more burden-
some standard of "substantial" rather than "sufficient" con-
nection with the United States upon Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, or
did the plurality inadvertently use the word substantial? In
light of the Court's reliance on the textual significance of peo-
ple as opposed to persons in its fourth amendment analysis, it
is difficult to understand the interchangeable use of the words
sufficient and substantial.239
The plurality failed to define clearly its sufficient connec-
tion test. The vagueness of the plurality's sufficient connection
test, therefore, bars its uniform application.
B. The Plurality's Reliance on Eisentrager and the Insular Cases
Is Misplaced
In the Insular Cases and Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court
seemed to expand the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction.2" °
Verdugo-Urquidez, however, appears to be a retreat to the nine-
teenth century concept of strict territoriality that was rejected
in Reid.24" ' The plurality distinguished the rationale in Reid
from Verdugo-Urquidez by stating that Reid was only applicable
to U.S. citizens.242 The plurality instead relied on Johnson v.
Eisentrager, a case decided seven years before Reid.243
The plurality's application of the holding of Eisentrager24 4
is misplaced for two reasons. 245 First, Eisentrager concerned en-
emy aliens while Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez is a non-hostile alien.
238. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
239. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing plurality's "peo-
ple-person distinction").
240. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1957) (extending Constitution's
application to acts by U.S. government in foreign country against U.S. citizens); Bal-
zac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (stating that U.S. Constitution "is in force
in Porto Rico [sic] as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that govern-
ment is exerted").
241. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing Reid case wherein
U.S. Constitution was applied outside United States).
242. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
243. Id.
244. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). For a discussion of the facts
of Eisentrager, see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
245. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063 (1990).
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The defendants in Eisentrager were World War II war criminals
imprisoned in Germany. 24 6 The Court held that these non-res-
ident enemy aliens did not have a constitutional right to a jury
trial. 247 The Eisentrager Court's distinction between non-hos-
tile aliens and hostile aliens is significant. The Eisentrager
Court indicated that the aliens' status as enemies of the United
States accused of war crimes was a crucial factor affecting the
decision to deny them constitutional rights.248 Second, the
Verdugo-Urquidez case involved the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, which might be regarded as
quite distinct from the fifth amendment right to a jury trial that
was at issue in Eisentrager.
Because the Eisentrager decision applied to hostile aliens, it
did not necessarily bar the assertion of constitutional rights by
aliens abroad. 249 The plurality, however, declined to recog-
nize the Eisentrager distinction between non-hostile and hostile
aliens as significant. 250 Perhaps the plurality viewed the meta-
phorical "War on Drugs''2 5' as sufficiently similar to an actual
246. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 763; see infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text
(discussing application of fifth amendment to war criminals).
247. Id. at 765-66.
248. Id. at 770. The Court stated that
[t]he alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has
,been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an
implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights.
Id. The Court stated further that "courts in peace time have little occasion to inquire
whether litigants before them are alien or citizen. It is war that exposes the relative
vulnerability of the alien's status." Id. at 771. The Court further noted that "our law
does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the world between...
aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance." Id. at 768-69. "The enemy alien is
bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the
cause of our enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his alle-
giance, regards him as part of the enemy resources." Id. at 772-73.
249. See Note, Unalienable Rights, supra note 15, at 656 n.40; see also Note, Search-
ing the World, supra note 15, at 496.
250. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063 (1990).
251. See, e.g., Kraus, Helicopters for Mexico Draw Protests in Congress, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 29, 1990, at A5, col. 1 (noting that "[als part of its war on drugs, the Bush
Administration is scheduled to begin delivering military helicopters to Mexico" to aid
Mexican efforts to catch traffickers); Friedman, Bush's Role in Drug War, Newsday, May
8, 1988 (noting that President Bush admitted that "in some ways [the United States
is] losing ground" in fighting the flow of drugs abroad).
For a compilation of recent legislation designed to eliminate the exclusionary
rule to the warrant requirement in the drug setting, see Wisotsky, Crackdown: The
Emergency "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 895-907 (1987);
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war to rely on Eisentrager. Although real war may permit, and
sometimes even require, a relaxation of restraints on govern-
mental action,252 war was not a factor in Verdugo-Urquidez. Nev-
ertheless, by relying on Eisentrager the plurality essentially
treated Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez like a war criminal.
The plurality rejected the extraterritorial application of
the fourth amendment by relying on the prior denial of fifth
amendment rights to aliens outside the United States in Eisen-
trager.253 In its analysis, the plurality also relied on the "incon-
clusive" "people-person distinction," noting that the fifth
amendment refers to the relatively universal term of "person"
while the fourth amendment only applies to "the people. 2 54
The Court's reliance on the Insular Cases is similarly mis-
placed. Unlike the Court's decision in Reid, the Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez did not limit the Insular Cases to their facts.2 55
In Reid, the Court explicitly stated that neither the Insular Cases
nor their reasoning should be expanded. 25 6 The Insular Cases
exclusively addressed whether an alien accused of a crime en-
joyed the protections of certain constitutional rights in crimi-
nal prosecutions brought by territorial authorities in territorial
courts over which the U.S. government exercised sovereign
power.257 The Insular Cases, therefore, should have little prece-
dential value where the constitutional claim is made against
U.S. agents rather than territorial agents.25 8
International Narcotics Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(l)(D) (1988) ("Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the President is authorized to furnish assistance
to any country or international organization, on such terms and conditions as he may
determine, for the control of narcotic... drugs"); Stephan, supra note 19, at 784-85.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (denying com-
pensation to owners of oil installations destroyed by U.S. military to prevent them
from falling into enemy hands); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(sustaining massive internment of Japanese-Americans). See generally Wisotsky, supra
note 251 (claiming that courts are ignoring fourth amendment violations in drug
cases as result of public sentiment that drug dealers should not go free on "legal
technicalities"); Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility " and the Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sionay Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1987).
253. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063 (1990); Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763.
254. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1063.
255. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing Insular Cases).
256. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (stating that "it is our judgment that
neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion").
257. See id.
258. See id.; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1062
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C. A Retreat to a Territorial Approach to Constitutional Protection
In its territorial approach to the application of constitu-
tional rights, Verdugo-Urquidez illustrates problems of both logic
and policy. Although the fourth amendment contains no ex-
press or implied territorial limitations, the plurality attached
importance to both the location of the place searched and the
location of the accused at the time of the search.
1. Significance of the Location of the Constitutional
Violation
The plurality emphasized that a fourth amendment viola-
tion occurs only at the location of the search. 259 The plurality
did not hold, however, that the fourth amendment does not
apply simply because the search occurred outside the United
States.2 60 Indeed, the plurality's analysis implied that an alien
who had developed sufficient connection with the United
States would be protected by the fourth amendment regardless
of the location of the search. 26' The location of the govern-
ment conduct, therefore, seems to have limited significance,
yet the plurality relied on this factor extensively in its decision.
2. The Verdugo-Urquidez Plurality Requires Voluntary
Presence
Furthermore, the plurality considered the location of the
accused at the time of the search. 262 Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez
was involuntarily present in the United States at the time of the
search.263 In light of existing case law, one would expect that
(1990). The plurality focused, however, on the proposition that "not every constitu-
tional provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has
sovereign power." Id. The plurality, therefore, reasoned that since no "fundamen-
tal" constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories,
which are ultimately governed by Congress, there is little support for the claim that
the protections of the fourth amendment extend to aliens in foreign nations. Id. In
its analysis, the plurality focused only on the identity of the alleged victims of the
constitutional violation and not on the activities of the U.S. agents committing the
violation. Id.
259. Id. at 1060. The plurality noted that "[for purposes of this case, therefore,
if there was a constitutional violation, it occurred solely in Mexico." Id.
260. See id. at 1070 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1060.
263. See id. at 1057.
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the plurality would consider his presence a connection with the
United States.264 The plurality, however, refused to consider
this connection relevant in its fourth amendment analysis.
265
Instead, the plurality required for the first time that Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez's presence in the United States be volun-
tary.26
6
Implicit in the plurality's reasoning is the proposition that
fourth amendment rights do not vest in an alien immediately
upon entry. In creating this voluntariness requirement, how-
ever, the plurality failed to identify fully which rights vest in an
alien immediately upon entry and which require more ties with
the United States.267
D. Plurality Implies Preferential Status for Illegal Aliens in the
United States
The requirement that an alien's connection to the United
States be voluntary gives those unlawfully present in the
United States greater constitutional protection than those law-
fully but involuntarily present in the United States.2 6 8 The plu-
rality rejected the applicability of Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, but seemed to consider that an illegal
alien merited greater constitutional protection than Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez.269 In its analysis, the plurality assumed
that illegal aliens had rights under the fourth amendment.
270
In distinguishing the two categories of aliens, the plurality
noted that illegal aliens entered the United States voluntarily,
while Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez entered against his will. 2 7 '
264. Id. at 1070 n.5; see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing
extension of constitutional rights).
265. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
266. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (rejecting notion that individ-
ual's connection to United States must be voluntary or sustained to qualify for consti-
tutional protection).
267. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
268. See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text (discussing plurality's addi-
tional requirement of voluntary presence).
269. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1065.
270. Id. at 1065.
271. Id.; see Note, Alien Membership in the Constitutional Compact: Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness in Foreign Lands-United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, B.Y.U. L. REV. 319,
328 n.55 (1989) (noting that both illegal aliens in United States and aliens involunta-
rily present in United States should receive constitutional protections in criminal
proceedings because they are amenable to U.S. criminal laws); Jean v. Nelson, 727
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It is difficult to rationalize the preferential status given to
illegal aliens. Illegal aliens have not necessarily made an ex-
press promise to give up any rights or accepted any "societal
obligations." While it may be argued that illegal aliens have
made an implied promise to obey U.S. law, the same implied
promise is expected of criminal defendants like Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez.27 2 Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez must accept the decision
of a U.S. court and serve a prison term in the United States.
Thus, Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez has been forced to accept certain
obligations toward the United States.
E. Verdugo-Urquidez Creates a Double Standard of Justice
Withholding fourth amendment protections from non-res-
ident aliens and granting them to citizens who are accused of
the same illegal conduct creates an unacceptable double stan-dard of justice.j7ustice Brennan stated in his dissent that
U.S. agents acting in an unreasonable manner within or
outside of the United States disregard values inherent in the
Constitution.2 74
Justice Brennan suggested that mutuality instills the val-
ues of law and order.275 Verdugo-Urquidez, by extension, seems
to encourage lawlessness. The immediate success of a particu-
lar law enforcement effort against a foreign national is not
worth surrendering the U.S. principles of protection of human
F.2d 957, 973 (11 th Cir.) (stating, in dicta, that "aliens who are the victims of uncon-
stitutional government action abroad are protected by the Bill of Rights if the gov-
ernment seeks to exploit fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding in the
United States"), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
272. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1065 (1990)
(suggesting that illegal aliens have accepted societal obligations that Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez did not accept).
273. Id. at 1071 (Brennan,J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan noted, in cases of
"international criminal conspiracy, citizens and foreign nationals may be co-defend-
ants charged under the same statutes for the same conduct and facing the same pen-
alties if convicted." Id.
274. Id. at 1072 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Dolan, Aliens' Fourth Amendment
Right Against Government Searches Abroad-United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 64
WASH. L. REV. 701, 716-18 (discussing benefits of single standard of criminal justice
for citizens and aliens and noting that U.S. intervention in international arena in-
cludes responsibility to treat foreign nationals fairly).
275. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1071 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that respect for the rights of foreign
nationals encourages other nations to respect the rights of U.S. citizens. Id.
306 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:267
rights and respect for the citizens and governments of sover-
eign nations.
F. Future Ramifications of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
Although U.S. criminal laws may be extended beyond the
borders of the United States, 276 in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez the U.S. Supreme Court decided that fourth amend-
ment protections do not follow. A majority of the Justices in
Verdugo-Urquidez agreed that U.S. agents do not need to obtain
a search warrant to conduct an extraterritorial search of the
property of a non-resident alien who lacks sufficient connec-
tion to the United States. 27 The Court did not identify the
connections necessary to satisfy its sufficient connection re-
quirement.2 78 It found, however, that a non-resident alien in-
voluntarily present in the United States while awaiting U.S.
criminal prosecution did not have sufficient connection to
grant fourth amendment protections against an extraterritorial
search.
A majority of the Court dispensed with the warrant re-
quirement for extraterritorial searches against non-resident
aliens. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor,
and Scalia went a step further, suggesting that because these
non-resident aliens were not part of "the people," they were
not entitled to any fourth amendment protection. Conse-
quently, extraterritorial searches of non-resident aliens' prop-
erty may not require probable cause or reasonableness.
Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the plurality's textual
analysis of the fourth amendment. Rather, Justice Kennedy
stated that non-resident aliens enjoy the protections of the
Due Process Clause. 279 Arguably, Justice Kennedy therefore
would require that extraterritorial searches be reasonable in
accordance with the Due Process Clause.
276. Note, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combatting International Ter-
rorism, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298, 309-11 (1989-90) (discussing application of U.S.
criminal laws abroad).
277. The majority of the Justices in Verdugo-Urquidez agreed only to the principle
that a warrant is not required for extraterritorial searches. For a discussion of each
Justices opinion, see supra notes 130, 136, 161, 167 & 196 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 203-34 (discussing sufficient connection test).
279. The Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person
shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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Justice Stevens in his concurrence and Justice Blackmun in
his dissent stated that non-resident aliens are entitled to some
fourth amendment protection. Both Justices stated that U.S.
agents are not required to obtain a warrant to conduct extra-
territorial searches, but the searches must be reasonable. Jus-
tice Blackmun would not consider whether the government's
action in Verdugo-Urquidez was reasonable without further pro-
ceedings, while Justice Stevens found that the search was rea-
sonable.
Perhaps the most disturbing result of this decision is the
plurality's suggestion that only U.S. citizens and resident aliens
were intended to benefit from the protections of the U.S. Con-
stitution. 280 Although it may be true that certain rights are
only intended for citizens and non-resident aliens, the general
law of nations is not similarly limited.281
Prior to Verdugo-Urquidez, an alien's presence within the
United States guaranteed the application of constitutionalized
criminal investigative procedures.282 In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Supreme Court limited the class of individuals
that is protected by the fourth amendment. Indeed, the
Verdugo-Urquidez decision results in the creation of a new cate-
gory of individuals who are within U.S. territory but unable to
claim full constitutional protections in criminal investigations.
It seems unlikely that the rationale employed in Verdugo-
Urquidez would impact the constitutional protections granted to
U.S. citizens abroad or legal aliens within the United States be-
cause they would still have sufficient connection to the United
States. The rationale, however, could be used to limit the con-
stitutional protections granted to other classes of individuals.
For example, the Court could find that non-resident aliens are
not entitled to fourth amendment protection against a search
280. Verdugo-Irquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1060.64; See Case Comment, United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 747, 753 (1990).
281. For example, James Madison spoke in the Virginia ratifying convention
about the importance of creating foreign diversity jurisdiction in federal courts so
that foreign creditors could recover legitimate debts incurred in transactions with
U.S. citizens. Speech of James Madison, reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 583 (1836);
Friendly, The Historic Basis of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495 (1928).
Indeed, the first Judiciary Act provided that aliens could sue in federal court for any
tort under the law of nations. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1988)).
282. See Case Comment, supra note 280, at 753.
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occurring within or outside the United States, because they are
not part of "the people." The Court might also incorporate
illegal aliens into the category of individuals lacking sufficient
connection to the United States to be granted fourth amend-
ment protection. Indeed, the plurality in Verdugo-Urquidez re-
tracted slightly from its recent Lopez-Mendoza opinion,2 ss
thereby leaving the question whether illegal aliens are entitled
to fourth amendment protection in doubt. The Verdugo-
Urquidez rationale could be used to support the proposition
that illegal presence, like involuntary presence, is not the type
of presence to indicate connection with the United States.
CONCLUSION
The United States should decide whether drug prosecu-
tions require a relaxing of constitutional protections, and
whether the U.S. "War on Drugs" warrants as much govern-
mental disregard of individual rights as might be condoned
during a real war. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit warned that "we also must take great pains to ensure
that the Constitution does not become the first casualty in the
'War on Drugs.'"284 The Supreme Court did not heed this
warning in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.
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